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                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
     
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 10-2740 
______ 
 
MANINDER SINGH,  
                                   Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                        Respondent 
______ 
         
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
(No. A095-584-628) 
______ 
        
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2011 
 
Before: BARRY, AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  June 24, 2011) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 This is a petition by Maninder Singh (“Singh”) for review of an order of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Singh, who is a Sikh, seeks 
relief based on this affiliation.  Because substantial evidence shows that country 
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conditions in India are now more hospitable to Sikhs, Singh lacks a well-founded fear of 
future persecution in India.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition. 
I. 
 Petitioner Singh is a native and citizen of India.  On February 24, 2002, he entered 
the United States through Buffalo, New York without admission or parole.  He filed an 
asylum application on June 28, 2002.  Subsequently, on October 26, 2006, the 
Department of Homeland Security filed a Notice to Appear (“NTA”).  The NTA charged 
Singh with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I) as an alien in the United 
States without authorization.  On April 9, 2008, at a calendar hearing, Singh admitted the 
factual allegations in the NTA and conceded removability.  On July 10, 2009, Singh 
requested relief from removal by seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 
protection.   
A merits hearing was held in immigration court on January 21, 2010.  Singh 
testified that he suffered persecution in India because of his Sikh religion and his 
membership in the All Indian Sikh Student Federation (“AISSF”).  Singh testified that on 
June 4, 1999, he attended a rally with his father, a member of another Sikh political 
group, Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar.  After the rally, Singh testified that police arrested 
him, beat him with sticks, took him to the police station, and forced him to run barefoot 
in the sun until he became unconscious.  Additionally, Singh testified that on March 15, 
2001, he attended a political meeting and assisted transporting others.  After the meeting, 
police arrested him, beat him, and interrogated him as to his father‟s whereabouts.  Singh 
claimed he received hospital treatment after this detention.  Following this incident, in 
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early 2002, Singh fled to the United States to avoid further persecution due to his Sikh 
affiliation.  Singh maintains the police in India continue to search for him. 
 In response to Singh‟s testimony, the Government submitted background 
information regarding current political conditions in India, including an April 2008 
Department of State Issue Paper (“Issue Paper”) and Department of State Responses 
(“Responses”) concerning current country conditions relating to Sikhs.  The Issue Paper 
notes that current conditions in India have become more hospitable to Sikhs, adding that 
the current prime minister and other high-ranking officials are Sikh.  The Responses state 
that persecutions of Sikhs participating in AISSF and Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar, are 
“no longer a problem.”  Appx. at 262.  The Responses additionally classify the Akali Dal 
as a “moderate regional political party rather than a radical Sikh movement.”  Id.  Finally, 
the Responses conclude “[i]t is safe to assume that Sikhs claiming political asylum are 
not legitimate, but are rather attempting to use the asylum process to establish residency 
in the United States.”  Id. at 263. 
On January 25, 2010, the IJ denied Singh‟s requests for relief and ordered him 
removed.  The IJ found Singh not credible because Singh‟s testimony was vague and 
inconsistent with record information relating to country conditions.  The IJ also cited a 
lack of corroborative evidence in the record, especially the lack of newspaper accounts 
related to the rallies Singh allegedly attended.  The IJ also found that even assuming 
Singh was credible and had been persecuted in the past, Singh lacked a well-founded fear 
of future persecution due to changed country conditions in India.  Finally, the IJ denied 
Singh‟s withholding of removal and CAT claims. 
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Singh appealed.  The BIA dismissed the appeal on May 28, 2010.  The BIA agreed 
with the IJ‟s determination that Singh was not credible because his testimony was 
inconsistent with background information and lacked corroboration.  Finally, the BIA 
noted that even if Singh could demonstrate past persecution, the Government had 
rebutted any presumption of future persecution with background evidence showing 
changed country conditions in India.  Singh now petitions for review of the BIA‟s 
decision.    
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a).  “Where, as here, the BIA adopts and affirms the decision of the IJ, as well as 
provides its own reasoning for its decision, the Court reviews both the decisions of the IJ 
and the BIA.”  Hashmi v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 
2008).  “We review the Agency‟s findings of fact – such as the IJ‟s credibility 
determinations, his findings on the CAT claim, and his findings regarding 
changed country conditions – under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), which provides that 
„administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.‟”  Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 322 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  We have read 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) to require “substantial evidence” 
review.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  Therefore, 
exercising “substantial evidence” review, we must uphold administrative findings if they 
are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.”  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).   
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III. 
 The Attorney General has discretionary authority to grant asylum to a removable 
alien, but may exercise that discretion only if the alien is a “refugee.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b).  A refugee is a “person unable or unwilling to return to the country of that 
person‟s nationality or habitual residence because of past persecution or because of a 
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of . . . race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Sheriff v. Att’y Gen. of the 
United States, 587 F.3d 584, 589 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
applicant bears the initial burden of proving refugee status.  Shardar v. Att’y Gen. of the 
United States, 503 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2007).  “An applicant who offers credible 
testimony regarding past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.”  Ghebrehiwot v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 467 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citing Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 323).  A well-founded fear of future persecution has 
two prongs: (1) a subjectively genuine fear of persecution and (2) an objectively 
reasonable possibility of persecution.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 
(1987).  “The subjective prong requires a showing that the fear is genuine.”  
Ghebrehiwot, 467 F.3d at 351.  “To satisfy the objective prong, a petitioner must show he 
or she would be individually singled out for persecution or demonstrate that „there is a 
pattern or practice in his or her country . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly 
situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.‟”  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 
637 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)).  To reach the level of a 
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“pattern or practice,” we have required that “the persecution of the group must be 
systematic, pervasive, or organized.”  Id.  Additionally, “the acts must be committed by 
the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.”  Id.  
 An applicant‟s credible testimony alone is sufficient to establish past persecution.  
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a).  Once the applicant establishes past persecution, he “shall be 
presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.”  
Sheriff, 587 F.3d at 589.  However, the Government can rebut the presumption of future 
persecution by establishing – by a preponderance of the evidence – that conditions in the 
alien‟s country have changed so as to make his fear no longer reasonable.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A); Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir. 2003).  “„The 
burden of proof in a changed-country-conditions rebuttal is on the government.‟”  Sheriff, 
587 F.3d at 590 (quoting Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 327)).   
Here, we assume Singh‟s testimony relating to his past persecution was credible.1   
Nevertheless, we will deny Singh‟s asylum petition because there is substantial evidence 
to support the conclusion that he lacks a well-founded fear of future persecution due to 
changed country conditions in India.   
Singh‟s testimony regarding past persecution gave rise to a rebuttable presumption 
of a well-founded fear of future persecution.  See Mulanga, 349 F.3d at 132.  The 
                                              
1  The IJ and the BIA determined that Singh was not credible.  Appx. at 4, 115.  We 
need not review the credibility determination because even if Singh was credible, we 
would still deny his petition.  Substantial evidence supports the IJ‟s and BIA‟s decisions 
that Singh lacks a well-founded fear of future persecution in India.  See Kayembe v. 
Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 2003) (“If the BIA‟s decision can be found to be 
supported by substantial evidence, even if [Petitioner‟s] testimony is credible, then the 
absence of a finding on credibility is not significant to the disposition of the case.”). 
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Government successfully rebutted this presumption by showing, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that Singh‟s fear of future persecution was unfounded due to changed 
country conditions.  See id.  Consistent with the IJ and BIA determinations, the 
Government submitted evidence of changed country conditions, thereby undermining 
Singh‟s contention that he would face future persecution upon return to India.   
Substantial record evidence supports the conclusions of the IJ and BIA.  The 
Government submitted two State Department reports, the Issue Paper and Responses.  
We have previously held that “State Department reports may constitute „substantial 
evidence‟ for the purposes of reviewing immigration decisions.”  Ambartsoumian v. 
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 
235 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Here, the Issue Paper specifically addressed the status of Sikhs 
within India.  As discussed by the IJ and BIA, the Issue Paper notes that the Prime 
Minister of India is a Sikh and that the political party that targeted Singh is no longer in 
power.  Additionally, the State Department Responses conclude that, regarding Sikhs in 
India, “[c]onditions have improved so dramatically that there have been no legitimate 
grounds for such asylum claims since the early to mid-1990s” and that “[i]t is safe to 
assume that Sikhs claiming political asylum are not legitimate, but are rather attempting 
to use the asylum process to establish residency in the United States . . . .”  Appx. at 263.  
After considering the reports submitted by the Government, we think there is substantial 
evidence to support the conclusions of the IJ and BIA that Singh lacks a well-founded 
fear of future persecution.  Accordingly, we will deny Singh‟s asylum claim.   
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 Having determined Singh did not meet the threshold for asylum, we necessarily 
deny Singh‟s claim for withholding of removal, a type of relief with a higher standard 
than asylum.  See Ghebrehiwot, 467 F.3d at 351 (“Because [the standard for withholding 
of removal] is higher than that governing eligibility for asylum, an alien who fails to 
qualify for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal.”).   
Finally, we will also deny Singh‟s claim for CAT protection.  As defined in 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a), “torture” must occur “by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  But as 
the IJ noted, Indian law prohibits torture, the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation is 
pursuing charges against police officials who previously tortured and killed Sikhs, and 
Sikhs no longer suffer persecution per se.  Appx. at 119-21.  Therefore, because the 
evidentiary record as a whole does not “compel” the conclusion that Singh is more likely 
than not to be tortured if removed to India, Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1; Sevoian 
v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002), we will uphold the BIA‟s decision and 
deny Singh‟s CAT claim, see Kibinda v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 477 F.3d 113, 
123 (3d Cir. 2007).   
IV. 
 For these reasons, we will deny Singh‟s petition for review. 
